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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the mechanism of persistent inflation differentials, current account 
imbalances, and fiscal deficits in the euro area by constructing a multi-country model in which 
the optimization behaviors of governments as well as those of households, firms, and the 
European Central Bank are explicitly incorporated. The model indicates that governments can 
temporarily adhere to their own intrinsic preferences because fiscal policies are not unified in 
the euro area. This behavior generates problems, such as inflation differentials, and the stability 
and growth pact does not appear to be sufficiently effective in preventing such deviations. The 
results in this paper imply that the balance between national sovereignty and economic stability 
should be shifted more to the side of stability and that the euro area has to become more 
politically unified. In addition, the inflation differentials provide clear evidence that inflation 
acceleration is not caused by monetary policies but by government behavior because monetary 
policies are unified in the euro area whereas fiscal policies are not. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Greek financial crisis in 2010 intensified concerns that the euro is seriously flawed and 
reignited the dispute about the feasibility of a euro-type monetary union. Often mentioned 
problems, such as persistent inflation differentials, current account imbalances, and the violation 
of fiscal rules, portended the crisis. National inflation rates of the member states have diverged 
over the last decade and non-negligible inflation differentials have continued (ECB, 2003; 
Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2007; Gregoriou et al., 2011). The inflation differentials in the euro 
area have been far more substantial and persistent than those among the states of the U.S. 
(Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2007; Fendel and Frenkel, 2009). In addition, asymmetry in current 
account balances between northern members (e.g., Austria, Finland, Germany, and the 
Netherlands) and southern members (e.g., Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) have persisted 
(Gros et al., 2005; de Grauwe, 2009; Decressin and Stavrev, 2009; EC, 2009; Holinskia et al., 
2010; Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon, 2010). The northern members’ current accounts have shown 
surpluses, whereas those of the southern members have shown deficits. The current account 
imbalances have been substantial, and they persisted and deteriorated until the wake of the 
financial crisis, after which there were signs of a temporary reversal of the trend (Gros et al., 
2005; Decressin and Stavrev, 2009; de Grauwe, 2009). In addition, the 3% fiscal deficit cap has 
been violated by many member governments (ECB, 2007, 2008b), particularly Greece, France, 
Italy, and Portugal (ECB, 2008b). 
 Inflation differentials in the euro area basically originate in the prices of non-tradable 
goods and services (ECB, 2005; Žďárek and Aldasoro, 2009; Zemanek et al., 2010), and the 
non-tradable sector contributes to substantial unit-labor-cost differentials between the member 
countries (Zemanek et al., 2010). These observations indicate that competitiveness differentials 
within the euro area exist, and those differentials will lead to intra-euro area current account 
imbalances (Blanchard, 2007; Arghyrou and Chortareas, 2008; EC, 2009). Without full labor 
market flexibility, heterogeneous competitiveness results in large-scale and persistent current 
account deficits in relatively less competitive member states and surpluses in more competitive 
ones (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002; Blanchard, 2007; EC, 2009). Diversified prices of 
non-tradable goods and services makes the Balassa–Samuelson effect a compelling explanation 
for the observed inflation differentials (Samuelson, 1994), but most empirical studies estimate 
that the Balassa–Samuelson effect is small (Coudert, 2004; Égert et al, 2006; Mihaljek and Klau, 
2008; Égert, 2010). Hence, many other potential mechanisms have been examined as the 
explanation for inflation differentials. For example, demand or potential output shocks as well 
as cost-push and exchange rate shocks (Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2007), fluctuations in the 
effective exchange rate (Hofmann and Remsperger, 2005), and asymmetric productivity shocks 
(Altissimo et al., 2005) have been proposed as the main source of inflation differentials (see also 
Honohan and Lane, 2003; Altissimo et al., 2005; Hofmann and Remsperger, 2005; Fendel and 
Frenkel, 2009; Žďárek and Aldasoro, 2009). However, at present there is no consensus on the 
mechanism of inflation differentials.  
 Since its creation, the euro has been criticized for lacking a unified fiscal authority 
(e.g., ECB, 2008a). Intuitively, the lack of a unified fiscal authority (i.e., the lack of a federal 
government) is a serious problem that could generate substantial negative effects, most likely 
including problems such as inflation differentials. However, these problems as well as the 
mechanisms by which they are generated have not been sufficiently explored theoretically, in 
part because most models used to analyze the euro area economy do not explicitly deal with the 
optimization behavior of government. If the behavior of government is not explicitly modeled, it 
will be impossible to show why and how the lack of a federal government causes problems. The 
financial crisis suggests that some member governments took profligate actions that appear to 
be irrational, but without a model that describes the behavior of government, it is difficult to 
determine why such actions were taken. 
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 To unravel the mechanism of problems such as inflation differentials, therefore, a 
model that explicitly describes the behavior of government as well as those of households, firms, 
and the central bank is needed. In this paper, such a model is constructed. In particular, the 
government and the central bank are treated as different entities, and their behaviors are clearly 
separated in the model. The model shows that inflation accelerates if the time preference rate of 
government is higher than that of the representative household. To stabilize inflation, therefore, 
the government’s time preference rate needs to be controlled by delegating monetary policies to 
an independent central bank. The model in this paper indicates that if there is more than one 
government but only one central bank (as is the case with the euro area), the central bank cannot 
sufficiently control the time preference rate of each member government. Thus, inflation 
differentials can be generated, and accordingly, current account imbalances are widened and 
fiscal balances are governed by complex non-linear processes. All of the model’s predictions are 
basically consistent with the abovementioned facts about the euro area economy.  
 An important result obtained is that the euro area needs to become more politically 
unified. The model indicates that the problems are generated not because the member 
governments are stupid, foolish, or irrational; rather they act quite rationally. The governments 
follow their own preferences, and the temptation to do so is so strong that the governments seek 
to exploit weaknesses in the structure of the euro. One such weakness is that the European 
Central Bank (ECB) cannot implement monetary policies aimed separately and specifically at 
each member state. By exploiting this weakness, governments can behave based on their own 
intrinsic time preferences. The stability and growth pact (SGP) was enacted to fix this flaw but 
it does not appear to have been sufficiently effective, and an alternative mechanism that controls 
each government’s preference is required.  
 In addition, the examination using the model presented in this paper makes an 
important contribution to the theory of inflation. The observed inflation differentials in the euro 
area provide clear evidence that inflation acceleration is not caused by monetary policies but by 
government behavior because inflation rates in the member states have diverged even though 
the monetary policies are unified. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a single-country model is constructed 
in which the optimization behaviors of government as well as those of households, firms, and 
the central bank are explicitly incorporated. This model is extended to a multi-country model in 
Section 3. With the extended multi-country model, the euro’s flaw is examined in Section 4. 
Concluding remarks are offered in Section 5. 
 
2  THE SINGLE-COUNTRY MODEL 
 
The single-country model is based on the model of inflation by Harashima (2008). The 
single-country model will be extended to a multi-country model in Section 3.  
 
2.1  The optimal trend inflation 
2.1.1  The government 
2.1.1.1  The government budget constraint 
The government budget constraint is 
 
 tttttt XGiBB   , 
 
where Bt is the nominal obligation of the government to pay for its accumulated bonds, it is the 
nominal interest rate for government bonds, Gt is the nominal government expenditure, Xt is the 
nominal tax revenue, and t  is the nominal amount of seigniorage at time t. The tax is assumed 
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to be lump sum, the government bonds are long term, and the returns on the bonds are realized 
only after the bonds are held during a unit period (e.g., a year). The government bonds are 
redeemed in a unit period, and the government successively refinances the bonds by issuing new 
ones at each time t. Let 
t
t
t P
Bb  , 
t
t
t P
Gg  , 
t
t
t P
Xx  , and 
t
t
t P
  , where Pt is the price level 
at time t. Let also 
t
t
t P
Pπ   be the inflation rate at time t. By dividing by Pt, the budget 
constraint is transformed to ttttt
t
t xgib
P
B  , which is equivalent to 
 
  tttttttttttttt xgπibπbxgibb    .              (1) 
 
 Because the returns on government bonds are realized only after holding the bonds 
during a unit period, investors buy the bonds if  dsrπEi t
t tstt    1  at time t, where ti  is 
the nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t and rt is the real interest rate in markets at t. 
Hence, by arbitrage,  dsrπEi t
t tstt    1  and if rt is constant such that rrt   (i.e., if it is at 
steady state), then 
 
 rdsπEi t
t stt
  1  . 
 
The nominal interest rate rdsπEi t
t stt
  1  means that, during a sufficiently small period 
between t and t + dt, the government’s obligation to pay for the bonds’ return in the future 
increases not by  rπdt t   but by    rdsπEdt tt st 1 . If πt is constant, then ttt st πdsπE  1  
and rπi tt  , but if πt is not constant, these equations do not necessarily hold. 
 Since bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively refinanced, the bonds the 
government is holding at t have been issued between t - 1 and t. Hence, under perfect foresight, 
the average nominal interest rate for all government bonds at time t is the weighted sum of ti  
such that 
 
 rds
dvB
B
dvπds
dvB
B
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t
t t
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t
t t
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1 ,
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1 ,
,  , 
 
where tsB ,  is the nominal value of bonds at time t that were issued at time s. If the weights 
 tt tv
ts
dvB
B
1 ,
,  between t - 1 and t are not so different from each other, then approximately 
rdsdυπi t
t
s
s υt    1 1 . To be precise, if the absolute values of πs for 11  tst  are 
sufficiently smaller than unity, the differences among the weights are negligible and then 
approximately 
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rdsd υπi t
t
s
s υt    1 1                         (2) 
 
(see Harashima, 2008). The average nominal interest rate for the total government bonds, 
therefore, develops by rdsdυπi t
t
s
s υt    1 1 . If πt is constant, then dsdυπtt ss υ  1 1  
tπ ; thus, rπi tt  . If πt is not constant, however, the equations t
t
t
s
s υ πdsdυπ   1 1  
and it = πt + r do not necessarily hold.  
 
2.1.1.2  An economically Leviathan government  
Under a proportional representation system, the government represents the median household 
whereas the representative household from an economic perspective represents the mean 
household.1 Because of this difference, they usually have different preferences. To account for 
this essential difference, a Leviathan government is assumed in the model.2 There are two 
extremely different views regarding government’s behavior in the literature on political 
economy: the Leviathan view and the benevolent view (e.g., Downs 1957; Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980; Alesina and Cukierman 1990). From an economic point of view, a benevolent 
government maximizes the expected economic utility of the representative household, but a 
Leviathan government does not. Whereas the expenditure of a benevolent government is a tool 
used to maximize the economic utility of the representative household, the expenditure of a 
Leviathan government is a tool used to achieve the government’s own policy objectives.3 For 
example, if a Leviathan government considers national security to be the most important 
political issue, defense spending will increase greatly, but if improving social welfare is the top 
political priority, spending on social welfare will increase dramatically, even though the 
increased expenditures may not necessarily increase the economic utility of the representative 
household. 
 Is it possible, however, for such a Leviathan government to hold office for a long 
period? Yes, because a government is generally chosen by the median of households under a 
proportional representation system (e.g., Downs 1957), whereas the representative household 
usually presumed in the economics literature is the mean household. The economically 
representative household is not usually identical to the politically representative household, and 
a majority of people could support a Leviathan government even if they know that the 
government does not necessarily pursue only the economic objectives of the economically 
representative household. In other words, the Leviathan government argued here is an 
economically Leviathan government that maximizes the political utility of people, whereas the 
conventional economically benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people. In 
addition, because the politically and economically representative households are different (the 
median and mean households, respectively), the preferences of future governments will also be 
similarly different from those of the mean representative household. In this sense, the current 
and future governments presented in the model can be seen as a combined government that goes 
on indefinitely; that is, the economically Leviathan government always represents the median 
representative household. 
 The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government 
                                                          
1 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay in reforms 
(e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992). 
2 The most prominent reference to Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
3 The government behavior assumed in the fiscal theory of the price level reflects an aspect of a Leviathan 
government. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies in 
which governments are viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in advance of prices 
being determined in markets. 
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expenditure, tax revenue, or related activities in the government’s political utility function (e.g., 
Edwards and Keen 1996). Because an economically Leviathan government derives political 
utility from expenditure for its political purposes, the larger the expenditure is, the happier the 
Leviathan government will be. But raising tax rates will provoke people’s antipathy, which 
increases the probability of being replaced by the opposing party that also nearly represents the 
median household. Thus, the economically Leviathan government regards taxes as necessary 
costs to obtain freedom of expenditure for its own purposes. The government therefore will 
derive utility from expenditure and disutility from taxes. Expenditure and taxes in the political 
utility function of the government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the 
economic utility function of the representative household. Consumption and labor hours are 
both control variables, and as such, the government’s expenditure and tax revenue are also 
control variables. As a whole, the political utility function of economically Leviathan 
government can be expressed as uG(gt, xt).4 In addition, it can be assumed on the basis of 
previously mentioned arguments that 0

t
G
g
u  and 02
2


t
G
g
u , and therefore that 0

t
G
x
u  
and 02
2


t
G
x
u .5 An economically Leviathan government therefore maximizes the expected 
sum of these utilities discounted by its time preference rate under the constraint of deficit 
financing. 
 
2.1.1.3  The optimization problem 
The optimization problem of an economically Leviathan government is  
 
   dttθ,xguEMax GttG   exp0  
 
subject to the budget constraint 
 
   ttttttt xgπibb   ,                       (3) 
 
where uG is the constant relative risk aversion utility function of the government, θG is the 
government’s rate of time preference, and E is the expectation operator. All variables are 
expressed in per capita terms, and population is assumed to be constant. The government 
maximizes its expected political utility considering the behavior of the economically 
representative household that is reflected in it in its budget constraint. 
 
2.1.2  Households 
The economically representative household maximizes its expected economic utility. Sidrauski 
(1967)’s well-known money in the utility function model is used for the optimization problem. 
                                                          
4 It is possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case, the utility function of a government 
can be assumed to be  ttttG l,c,x,gu , where ct is real consumption and lt is the leisure hours of the representative 
household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies do not affect steady-state consumption 
and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed to be  ttG x,gu . 
5 Some may argue that it is more likely that 0

t
G
x
u and 02
2


t
G
x
u . However, the assumption used is not an 
important issue here because     02
21







t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux
  at steady state, as will be shown in the solution to 
the optimization problem later in the paper. Thus, the results are not affected by which assumption is used.  
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The representative household maximizes its expected utility 
 
   dttθm,cuE PttP   exp0  
 
subject to the budget constraint 
 
      tttttttttt gmrπcσwara   , 
 
where uP and θP are the utility function and the time preference rate of the representative 
household, ct is real consumption, wt is real wage, σt is lump-sum real government transfers, mt 
is real money, at = kt + mt, and kt is real capital. It is assumed that rt = f’(kt), tw  
   ttt kfkkf  , 0'uP , 0"uP ,   0

t
ttP
m
m,cu , and   02
2


t
ttP
m
m,cu , where  f  is the 
production function. Government expenditure (gt) is an exogenous variable for the 
representative household because it is an economically Leviathan government. It is also 
assumed that, although all households receive transfers from a government in equilibrium, when 
making decisions, each household takes the amount it receives as given, independent of its 
money holdings. Thus, the budget constraint means that the real output  tkf  at any time is 
demanded for the real consumption ct, the real investment tk , and the real government 
expenditure gt such that   tttt gkckf   . The representative household maximizes its 
expected economic utility considering the behavior of government reflected in gt in the budget 
constraint. In this discussion, a central bank is not assumed to be independent of the 
government; thus, the functions of the government and the central bank are not separated. This 
assumption can be relaxed, and the roles of the government and the central bank are explicitly 
separated in Section 2.2. 
 Note that the time preference rate of government (θG) is not necessarily identical to 
that of the representative household (θP) because the government and the representative 
household represent different households (i.e., the median and mean households, respectively). 
In addition, the preferences will differ because (1) even though people want to choose a 
government that has the same time preference rate as the representative household, the rates 
may differ owing to errors in expectations (e.g., Alesina and Cukierman 1990); and (2) current 
voters cannot bind the choices of future voters and, if current voters are aware of this possibility, 
they may vote more myopically as compared with their own rates of impatience in private 
economic activities (e.g., Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Hence, it is highly likely that the time 
preference rates of a government and the representative household are heterogeneous. It should 
be also noted, however, that even though the rates of time preference are heterogeneous, an 
economically Leviathan government behaves based only on its own time preference rate, 
without hesitation. 
 
2.1.3  The simultaneous optimization 
First, I examine the optimization problem of the representative household. Let Hamiltonian HP 
be       ttttttttttP,PttPP gmrπcσwarλtθm,cuH  exp , where λP,t is a costate 
variable, ct and mt are control variables, and at is a state variable. The optimality conditions for 
the representative household are;  
     tP,P
t
ttP λtθ
c
m,cu 
 exp  ,                       (4) 
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      tttP,P
t
ttP rπλtθ
m
m,cu 
 exp  ,                    (5) 
 
ttP,tP, rλλ   ,                             (6) 
     ttttttttt gmrπcσwraa   ,                (7) 
 
0lim  ttP,t aλ  .                           (8) 
 
By conditions (4) and (5),     tt
t
ttP
t
ttP rπ
m
m,cu
c
m,cu 




 1 , and by conditions (4) and (6),  
 
   
tP
t
t
t
ttP
t
ttP
t rθc
c
c
m,cu
c
m,cuc 





 
2
21
 .                 (9) 
 
Hence, 
 
θP = rt = r                              (10) 
 
at steady state such that 0tc  and 0tk . 
 Next, I examine the optimization problem of the economically Leviathan government. 
Let Hamiltonian HG be       tttttttG,GttGG xgπibλtθx,guH  exp , where λG,t is a 
costate variable. The optimality conditions for the government are;  
     tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
g
x,gu 
 exp  ,                      (11) 
     tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
x
x,gu 
 exp  ,                      (12) 
 
 tttG,tG, πiλλ   ,                           (13) 
 
  ttttttt xgπibb   ,                      (14) 
 
0lim 
 ttG,t
bλ  .                            (15) 
 
Combining conditions (11), (12), and (13) and equation (2) yields the following equations: 
 
   
t
t
t
s
s υtttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t πdsdυπrπiθg
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug 




   

1
1
2
21        (16) 
 
and  
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   
t
t
t
s
s υtttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t πdsdυπrπiθx
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux 




   

1
1
2
21   .     (17) 
 
Here,     02
21





 
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug
  and     02
21





 
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux
  at 
steady state such that 0tg  and 0tx ; thus, 
 
t
t
t
s
s υtG πdsdυπrθ    1 1  .                   (18) 
 
Hence, by equation (10), 
 
PGt
t
t
s
s υ θθπdsdυπ   1 1                       (19) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk .6   
 Equation (19) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by the 
economically Leviathan government and the representative household. If the rates of time 
preference are heterogeneous between them, then 
 
 t
t
t
s
s υt πdsdυπri    1 1  . 
 
This result might seem surprising because it has been naturally conjectured that it = πt + r. 
However, this is a simple misunderstanding because πt indicates the instantaneous rate of 
inflation at a point such that 
t
t
t P
Pπ  , whereas dsdυπt
t
s
s υ  1 1  roughly indicates the 
average inflation rate in a period. Equation (19) indicates that πt develops according to the 
integral equation PG
t
t
s
s υt θθdsdυππ    1 1 . If πt is constant, the equations rπi tt   and 
t
t
t
s
s υ πdsdυπ   1 1  are true. However, if πt is not constant, the equations do not necessarily 
hold. Equation (19) indicates that the equations rπi tt   and t
t
t
s
s υ πdsdυπ   1 1  hold 
only in the case where θG = θP (i.e., a homogeneous rate of time preference). It has been 
previously thought that a homogeneous rate of time preference naturally prevails; thus, the 
equation it = πt + r has not been questioned. As argued previously, however, a homogeneous 
rate of time preference is not usually guaranteed. 
 
2.1.4  The law of motion for trend inflation 
Equation (19) indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates as a result of the government and 
the representative household reconciling the contradiction in heterogeneous rates of time 
                                                          
6 If and only if 
t
ttt
G b
xgθ   at steady state, then the transversality condition (15) 0lim  ttG,t bλ  holds. 
The proof is shown in Harashima (2008). 
 9
preference. If πt is constant, the equation dsdυππ t
t
s
s υt    1 1  holds; conversely, if tπ  
dsdυπt
t
s
s υ  1 1 , then πt is not constant. Without the acceleration or deceleration of inflation, 
therefore, equation (19) cannot hold in an economy in which PG θθ  . In other words, it is not 
until PG θθ   that inflation can accelerate or decelerate. Heterogeneous time preferences 
( PG θθ  ) bend the path of inflation and enables inflation to accelerate or decelerate. The 
difference of time preference rates ( PG θθ  ) at each time needs to be transformed to the 
accelerated or decelerated inflation rate πt at each time.  
     Equation (19) implies that inflation accelerates or decelerates nonlinearly in the case in 
which PG θθ  . For a sufficiently small period dt, dttπ 1  is determined with πs  11  tst  
that satisfies PGt
t
t
s
s υ θθπdsdυπ   1 1 , so as to hold the equation dsdυπdttt ss υ  1  
tdtt
dtt
t
s
s υ ππdsdυπ  


 11 1 . A solution of the integral equation (19) for given θG and 
θP is 
   20 6 tθθππ PGt   .                         (20) 
 
Generally, the path of inflation that satisfies equation (19) for t0  is expressed as 
 
     tzθθππ tPGt lnexp60   , 
 
where zt is a time dependent variable. The stream of zt is various depending on the boundary 
condition, i.e., the past and present inflation during 01  t  and the path of inflation during 
10  t  that is set to make π0 satisfy equation (19). However, zt has the following important 
property. If πt satisfies equation (19) for t0 , and  tπ  for 11  t , then  
 
 2lim 
 tt
z  . 
 
Proof is shown in Harashima (2008). Any inflation path that satisfies equation (19) for t0  
therefore asymptotically approaches the path of equation (20). The mechanism behind the law 
of motion for inflation (equation [20]) is examined more in detail in Harashima (2008). 
 
2.2  The central bank 
A central bank manipulates the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor-type 
instrument rule in the model; 
   tx*tπt xγππγγi   ,                       (21) 
 
where π* is the target rate of inflation and γ , γπ, and γx are constant coefficients. rπγ *   
as is usually assumed.  
 In Section 2.1, central banks are not explicitly considered because they are not 
assumed to be independent of governments. However, in actuality, central banks are 
independent organizations in most countries even though some of them are not sufficiently 
independent. Furthermore, in the conventional inflation model, it is the central banks that 
control inflation and governments have no role in controlling inflation. Conventional inflation 
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models show that the rate of inflation basically converges at the target rate of inflation set by a 
central bank. The target rate of inflation therefore is the key exogenous variable that determines 
the path of inflation in these models.  
     Both the government and the central bank can probably affect the development of 
inflation, but they would do so in different manners, as equation (20) and conventional inflation 
models indicate. However, the objectives of the government and the central bank may not be the 
same. For example, if trend inflation is added to conventional models by replacing their 
aggregate supply equations with equation (20), inflation cannot necessarily converge at the 
target rate of inflation because another key exogenous variable (θG) is included in the models. A 
government makes inflation develop consistently with the equation (20), which implies that 
inflation will not necessarily converge at the target rate of inflation. Conversely, a central bank 
makes inflation converge at the target rate of inflation, which implies that inflation will not 
necessarily develop consistently with equation (20). That is, unless either θG is adjusted to be 
consistent with the target rate of inflation or the target rate of inflation is adjusted to be 
consistent with θG, the path of inflation cannot necessarily be determined. Either θG or the target 
rate of inflation need be an endogenous variable. If a central bank dominates, the target rate of 
inflation remains as the key exogenous variable and θG should then be an endogenous variable. 
The reverse is also true.  
 A central bank will be regarded as truly independent if θG is forced to be adjusted to 
the one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation set by the central bank. For example, 
suppose that PG θθ   and a truly independent central bank manipulates the nominal interest 
rate according to the Taylor-type instrument rule (equation [21]). Here, 
 
tG
t
t
s
s υt πθrdsdυπi    1 1                      (22) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk  by equations (2), (10), and 
(19). If the accelerating inflation rate is higher than the target rate of inflation, the central bank 
can raise the nominal interest rate from tGt πθi   (equation [22]) to 
 
ψπθi tGt   
 
by positive ψ by intervening in financial markets to lower the accelerating rate of inflation. In 
this case, the central bank keeps the initial target rate of inflation because it is truly independent. 
The government thus faces a rate of increase of real obligation that is higher than θG by the extra 
rate ψ.7 If the government lowers θG so that θG < θP and inflation stops accelerating, the central 
bank will accordingly reduce the extra rate ψ. If, however, the government does not 
accommodate θG to the target rate of inflation, the extra rate ψ will increase as time passes 
because of the gap between the accelerating inflation rate and the target rate of inflation widens 
by equation (20) and γx in Taylor-type instrument rules is usually larger than unity, say 1.5. 
Because of the extra rate ψ, the government has no other way to achieve optimization unless it 
lowers θG to one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation. Once the government 
recognizes that the central bank is firmly determined to be independent and it is in vain to try to 
intervene in the central bank’s decision makings, the government would not dare to attempt to 
raise θG again anymore. 
 Equation (20) implies that a government allows inflation to accelerate because it acts 
                                                          
7 The extra rate ψ affects not only the behavior of government but also that of the representative household, in which 
the conventional inflation theory is particularly interested. In this sense, the central bank’s instrument rule that 
concerns and simultaneously affects both behaviors of the government and the representative household is 
particularly important for price stability. 
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to maximize its expected utility based only on its own preferences. A government is hardly the 
only entity that cannot easily control its own preferences even when these preferences may 
result in unfavorable consequences. It may not even be possible to manipulate one’s own 
preferences at will. Thus, even though a government is fully rational and is not weak, foolish, or 
untruthful, it is difficult for it to self-regulate its preferences. Hence, an independent neutral 
organization is needed to help control θG. Delegating the authority to set and keep the target rate 
of inflation to an independent central bank is a way to control θG. The delegated independent 
central bank will control θG because it is not the central bank’s preference to stabilize the price 
level—it is simply a duty delegated to it. An independent central bank is not the only possible 
choice. For example, pegging the local currency with a foreign currency can be seen as a kind of 
delegation to an independent neutral organization. In addition, the gold standard that prevailed 
before World War II can be also seen as a type of such delegation. 
 Note also that the delegation may not be viewed as bad from the Leviathan 
government’s point of view because only its rate of time preference is changed, and the 
government can still pursue its political objectives. One criticism of the argument that central 
banks should be independent (e.g., Blinder 1998) is that, since the time-inconsistency problem 
argued in Kydland and Prescott (1977) or Barro and Gordon (1983) is more acute with fiscal 
policy, why is it not also necessary to delegate fiscal policies? An economically Leviathan 
government, however, will never allow fiscal policies to be delegated to an independent neutral 
organization because the Leviathan government would then not be able to pursue its political 
objectives, which in a sense would mean the death of the Leviathan government. The median 
household that backs the Leviathan government, but at the same time dislikes high inflation, 
will therefore support the delegation of authority but only if it concerns monetary policy. The 
independent central bank will then be given the authority to control θG and oblige the 
government to change θG in order to meet the target rate of inflation. 
 Without such a delegation of authority, it is likely that generally θG > θP because θG 
represents the median household whereas θP represents the mean household. Empirical studies 
indicate that the rate of time preference negatively correlates with permanent income (e.g., 
Lawrance 1991), and the permanent income of the median household is usually lower than that 
of the mean household. If generally θG > θP, that suggests that inflation will tend to accelerate 
unless a central bank is independent. The independence of the central bank is therefore very 
important in keeping the path of inflation stable. 
     Note also that the forced adjustments of θG by an independent central bank are exogenous 
shocks to both the government and the representative household because they are planned solely 
by the central bank. When a shock on θG is given, the government and the representative 
household must recalculate their optimal paths including the path of inflation by resetting θG, πt, 
and φ.     
 
3  THE MULTI-COUNTRY MODEL 
 
In this section, the single-country model shown in Section 2 is extended to a multi-country 
model in the framework of endogenous growth, in which there is more than one government but 
only one central bank. More concretely, the single-country model is extended by combining it 
with the multi-country endogenous growth model by Harashima (2010). In addition, some 
technical modifications are made to the extended model so that the economics of monetary 
union can be analyzed. 
 
3.1  The optimization of households 
3.1.1  The base model 
The production function is  tttt ,L,KAFY  , and the accumulation of capital is 
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 tttt AνCYK    , 
 
where Yt is outputs, At is technology, Kt is capital inputs, Lt is labor inputs, Ct is consumption,  0ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and v-1 of a unit of At are equivalent: that is, they are 
produced using the same quantities of inputs. All firms are identical and have the same size, and 
for any period, 
 
t
t
L
Mμ   ,                               (23) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms, and  0μ  is a constant. In addition,  
 
 ttttt νA
Y
MK
Y


   ;                          (24) 
 
thus,  
 
t
t
t
t
A
y
μνk
y


                                (25) 
 
is always kept, where yt is output per capita, kt is capital per capita, and  1  is a constant. 
For simplicity, the period of patent is assumed to be indefinite, and no capital depreciation is 
assumed.   indicates the effect of patent protection. With patents, the income is distributed to 
not only capitals and labors but technologies. Equation (23) indicates that population and 
number of firms are positively correlated. Equations (24) and (25) indicate that returns on 
investing in Kt and in At are kept equal and that a firm that produces a new technology cannot 
obtain all the returns on an investment in At. This means that investing in At increases Yt, but the 
investing firm’s return on the investment in At is only a fraction of the increase of Yt, such that 
   tttttt νA
Y
μLνA
Y
M 

   because of uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other firms 
and complementarity of technologies. 
 A part of the knowledge generated as a result of an investment made by a firm spills 
over to other firms. Researchers in firms as well as universities and research institutions could 
not effectively generate innovations if they were isolated from other researchers. They contact 
and stimulate each other. Probably, mutual partial knowledge spillovers among researchers and 
firms give each other reciprocal benefits. Researchers take hints on their researches in exchange 
for spilled knowledge. Therefore, even though the investing firm wishes to keep its knowledge 
secret, some parts of it will spill over. In addition, many uncompensated knowledge spillovers 
occur because many technologies are regarded as so minor that they are not applied for patents 
and left unprotected by patents. Nevertheless, even if a technology that was generated as a 
byproduct is completely useless for the investing firm, it may be a treasure for firms in a 
different industry. At includes all these technologies, and an investment in technology generates 
many technologies that the investing firm cannot protect by patents.  
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Marshall-Arrow-Romer [MAR] externalities; Marshall, 
1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986) and inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Jacobs 
externalities; Jacobs, 1969). MAR theory assumes that knowledge spillovers between 
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homogenous firms work out most effectively and that spillovers will therefore primarily emerge 
within one sector. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if the 
number of firms within a sector is larger. On the other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that 
knowledge spillovers are most effective among firms that practice different activities and that 
diversification (i.e., a variety of sectors) is important for spillovers. As a result, uncompensated 
knowledge spillovers will be more active if the number of sectors in the economy is larger. 
Nevertheless, if all sectors have the same number of firms, an increase in the number of firms in 
the economy results in more active knowledge spillovers in any case, owing to either MAR 
externalities or Jacobs externalities. 
 Furthermore, as the volume of uncompensated knowledge spillovers increases, the 
investing firm’s returns on the investment in At decrease. 
t
t
A
Y

  indicates the total increase in Yt 
in the economy by an increase in At, which consists of increases in both outputs in the firm that 
invested in the new technologies and outputs in other firms that utilize the newly invented 
technologies, whether the firms obtained the technologies by compensating the originating firm 
or by using uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms becomes larger and 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers occur more actively, the compensated fraction in 
t
t
A
Y

  
that the investing firm can obtain becomes smaller, and the investing firm’s returns on the 
investment in At also become smaller. 
 Complementarity of technologies also reduces the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y

  that the investing 
firm can obtain. If a new technology is effective only if it is combined with some particular 
technologies, the return on the investment in technology will belong not only to the investing 
firm but to the firms that hold these particular technologies. For example, an innovation in 
software technology generated by a software company increases the sales and profits of 
computer hardware companies. The economy’s productivity increases because of the innovation 
but the increased incomes are attributed not only to the firm that generated the innovation but 
also to the firms that hold complementary technologies. A part of 
t
t
A
Y

  leaks to these firms. For 
them, the leaked income is a kind of rent revenue unexpectedly become obtainable thanks to the 
innovation. Most new technologies will have complementary technologies. In addition, as the 
number of firms increases, the number of firms that holds complementary technologies will also 
increase, and thereby these leaks will also increase.  
 Because of the uncompensated knowledge spillovers and the complementarity of 
technologies, therefore, the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y

  that an investing firm can obtain on average will 
be comparatively small, i.e.,   will be far smaller than Mt except that Mt is very small,8 and 
the fraction will decrease as Mt increases.  
 The production function is specified as  ttαtt ,LKfAY   where α  10  α  is a 
                                                          
8 If Mt is very small, the value of   will be far smaller than that for sufficiently large Mt, because the number of 
firms that can benefit from an innovation is constrained owing to very small Mt. The very small number of firms 
indicates that the economy is not sufficiently sophisticated, and thereby the benefit of an innovation can not be fully 
realized in the economy. This constraint can be modeled as   tM1~11~     where  1~   is a constant. 
Nevertheless, for sufficiently large Mt (i.e., in sufficiently sophisticated economies), the constraint is removed such 
that       ~~11~lim 1 tt MM . 
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constant. Let 
t
t
t L
Yy  , 
t
t
t L
Kk  , 
t
t
t L
Cc  , and 
t
t
t L
Ln
 , and assume that  tt LKf ,  is 
homogenous of degree one. Thus  tαtt kfAy   and tt
t
t
ttt knL
Aν
cyk 
 . By equation 
(25),   t
t
t kfμν
kαfA 
  because    tαttαt
t
t
t
t kfAkfAμν
α
k
y
Aμν
y 

 1 . 
 
3.1.2  Models with heterogeneous households 
Three heterogeneities―heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion, and productivity―are 
examined in endogenous growth models, which are modified versions of the model shown in 
Section 3.1.1. First, suppose that there are two economies― economy 1 and economy 2—that 
are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, or productivity. The population growth 
rate is zero (i.e., 0tn ). The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and 
capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. Note that 
the two-country models shown in this section can be extended to include numerous economies 
that have differing degrees of heterogeneity, which will be constructed in Section 3.2. 
 
3.1.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
First, a model in which the two economies are identical except for time preference is 
constructed. The rate of time preference of the representative household in economy 1 is θP,1 
and that in economy 2 is θP,2, and 2,1, PP θθ  . The production function in economy 1 is  tαtt kfAy ,1,1   and that in economy 2 is  tαtt kfAy ,2,2  , where yρ,t and kρ,t are, respectively, 
output and capital per capita in economy ρ in period t for ρ = 1, 2. The population of each 
economy is 
2
tL ; thus, the total for both is Lt, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies, and the number of firms is Mt. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt and 
that in economy 2 is tτ . Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral 
technological progress, the production functions are further specified as  
 
 αtρ,
α
tρ,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    211 ,ρLAKY αttαρ,tρ,t   . 
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration such that  
  
,t
,t
t
,t,t
,t
,t
k
y
A
yy
μνk
y
2
221
1
1
2 


   .                   (26) 
 
Equation (26) indicates that an increase in At enhances outputs in both economies such that  
 t
,t,t
ti,t
i,t
νA
YY
MK
Y


 21 , and because the population is equal (
2
tL ), 


i,t
i,t
i,t
i,t
k
y
K
Y  
 
 
 
 
 
t
,t,tt
t
,t,t
tt
,t,t
t A
yy
μv
L
νA
yy
μLνA
YY
M 


 212121
22
 . Therefore, 
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            t ttt ttt kfμν
kfkfα
kfμν
kfkfα
A
,2
,2,1
,1
,2,1
22 

   . 
 
Because equation (26) is always held through arbitration, equations tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1   , 
tt yy ,2,1   and tt yy ,2,1    are also held. Hence, 
 
      ttttt kfμν
kαf
kfμν
kαf
A
,2
,2
,1
,1

  . 
 
In addition, because    
t
,t,t
t
,t,t
A
yy
A
yy
,2
21
,1
21


  through arbitration, then tt AA ,2,1    is 
held. 
 The accumulated current account balance dsτt s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Since 






t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t  0,1,1  and dsτk
y t
s
t
t  0,2,2  represent 
income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
yτ t s
t
t
t  0,2,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
 
t
t
s
t
t τdsτ
k
y 
 0
,1
,1  
 
is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
  ,t,tt ,kkgτ 21  . 
 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
    dttθcuE Pt 1,0 ,11 exp    , 
 
subject to 
 
1
,1,10
,2
,2
,1,1 2




  ttttt s
t
t
tt
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk   ,            (27) 
 
and the representative household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
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    dttθcuE P,,t 20 22 exp    , 
 
subject to 
 
1
,2,20
,1
,1
,2,2 2




  ttttt s
t
t
tt
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk   ,              (28) 
 
where uρ,t, cρ,t, and ρ,tA , respectively, are the utility function, per capita consumption, and the 
increase in At by R&D activities in economy ρ in period t for ρ = 1, 2; E is the expectation 
operator; and ttt AAA ,2,1   . Equations (27) and (28) implicitly assume that each economy 
does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral and because   ttt kfμν
kfα
A
,1
,1

  
  ttkfμν
kfα
,2
,2

  and αρ,tkf  1 , then 
 
  tρ,t kαμν
αA  1
  
 
and 
 
    α
α
tρ,
tρ, αμν
α
k
y 


 11  . 
 
Since ,t,t AA 21    and 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1


 , then 
 
      
1
10
,1
,1
11 22




  tt,ttt s
t
t
,t,t
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk
  
        ,tt,tt
t
s
α
α
t
α
α
kαμL
αcτdsταμν
αkαμv
α
110
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Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt, the problem of scale effects 
vanishes and thereby    11
1 

ααμL
αμL
t
t
 .  
 Putting the above elements together, the optimization problem of economy 1 can be 
rewritten as  
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    dttθcuEMax P,t 1,0 11 exp    , 
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Similarly, that of economy 2 can be rewritten as 
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3.1.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The basic structure of the model with heterogeneous risk aversion is the same as that of 
heterogeneous time preference. The two economies are identical except in regard to risk 
aversion. The degree of relative risk aversion of economy 1 is 
'u
"ucε ,t
1
11
1   and that of 
economy 2 is 
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"ucε ,t
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2  , which are constant, and 21 εε  . The optimization problem of 
economy 1 is 
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and that of economy 2 is 
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3.1.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
With heterogeneous productivity, the production function is heterogeneous, not the utility 
function. Because technology At is common to both economies, a heterogeneous production 
function requires heterogeneity in elements other than technology. Prescott (1998) argues that 
unknown factors other than technology have made total factor productivity (TFP) heterogeneous 
across countries. Harashima (2009) argues that average workers’ innovative activities are an 
essential element of productivity and make TFP heterogeneous across workers, firms, and 
economies. Since average workers are human and capable of creative intellectual activities, they 
can create innovations even if their innovations are minor. It is rational for firms to exploit all 
the opportunities that these ordinary workers’ innovative activities offer. Furthermore, 
innovations created by ordinary workers are indispensable for efficient production. A 
production function incorporating average workers’ innovations has been shown to have a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form with a labor share of about 70% (Harashima 2009), such that 
 
α
t
α
t
α
tLAt LKAωωσY  1  ,                        (29) 
 
where ωA and ωL are positive constant parameters with regard to average workers’ creative 
activities, and σ  is a parameter that represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with 
regard to location. The parameters ωA and ωL are independent of At but are dependent on the 
creative activities of average workers. Thereby, unlike with technology At, these parameters can 
be heterogeneous across workers, firms, and economies. 
 In this model of heterogeneous productivity, it is assumed that workers whose 
households belong to different economies have different values of ωA and ωL. In addition, only 
productivity that is represented by αtLA Aωωσ  in equation (29) is heterogeneous between the 
two economies. The production function of economy 1 is  ,tαtα,t kfAωy 111   and that of 
economy 2 is  ,tαtα,t kfAωy 222  , where  10 11  ωω  and  10 22  ωω  are constants and 
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Because equation (26) is always held through arbitration, equations tt kω
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 Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt and thus  
  11
1 

ααμL
αμL
t
t
 , the optimization problem of economy 1 is 
 
    dttθcuEMax P,t   exp0 11  , 
 
subject to 
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and similarly, that of economy 2 is 
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3.1.3  Sustainable heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. The nature of sustainable heterogeneity is 
examined in a multi-country model of heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion and 
productivity, which is constructed by combining the three models in the previous section (see 
Harashima, 2010).  
 Suppose that there are N economies with identical population, and let ρ,ς,tτ  be the 
current account balance of economy ρ with economy ς, where ρ = 1, 2, … , N, ς = 1, 2, … , N, 
and ρ ≠ ς.  
 
Proposition: If and only if  
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for any ρ (= 1, 2, … , N), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are 
satisfied at steady state such that 
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for any ρ and ς (ρ ≠ ς).  
Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
On the balanced growth path satisfying the condition shown in Proposition, heterogeneities in 
time preference, risk aversion and productivity are sustainable by definition because all the 
optimality conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. Economies that keep 
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sustainable heterogeneity constitute a combined economy with productivity αt
α
N
q
q AωN 

 


1
1   
and the time preference rate 


 




 N
q
qP,q
N
q
q ωθω
1
1
1
 and degree of risk aversion 



 




 N
q
qq
N
q
q ωεω
1
1
1
 of the representative household. The nature of sustainable heterogeneity 
is examined more in detail in Harashima (2010). 
 
3.2  The law of motion for inflation in the multi-country 
endogenous growth model 
3.2.1  The monetary union 
Suppose that there is a monetary union that consists of N member states and one currency.  
There is no federal government in the monetary union, and fiscal policies are therefore 
implemented separately by each member. Monetary policies are unified and implemented only 
by the central bank of the monetary union, which is sufficiently independent of the member 
states. For simplicity, population in each member state is assumed to be identical and constant, 
and the total population in the monetary union is sufficiently large. Sustainable heterogeneity, as 
shown in Section 3.1.3, is kept. The time preference rate of the representative household in 
member state ρ is θP,ρ for ρ = 1, 2, …, N. The time preference rate of the government of member 
state ρ is θG,ρ and θG,ρ > θP,ρ. Suppose for simplicity that    22
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 are positive and constant, similar to the 
degree of relative risk aversion of households. εg and εx are, respectively, identical across 
member governments, such that gg,ρ εε   and xx,ρ εε   for any ρ. 
 As shown in Section 3.1.3, economies that keep sustainable heterogeneity constitute a 
combined economy with productivity αt
α
N
q
q AωN 

 


1
1  and the time preference rate 



 




 N
q
qP,q
N
q
q ωθω
1
1
1
and degree of risk aversion 


 




 N
q
qq
N
q
q ωεω
1
1
1
 of the representative 
household. The combined economy grows at the constant rate 
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(equation [31]) where ct is the consumption of the representative household of the monetary 
union. Because sustainable heterogeneity is kept in the monetary union, the time preference rate 
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of the representative household of the monetary union is P
N
q
qP,q
N
q
q θωθω 


 


 1
1
1
. Because 
the size of an economy in the monetary union is measured by the productivity differential 
parameter ωρ, the integrated time preference rate of government in the monetary union is 
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. The overall rate of inflation in the monetary union is πt. The 
central bank of the monetary union sets θG equal to θP so that πt will not accelerate.   
 Because  
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across the monetary union, where yt, kt, and rt are the per capita outputs, per capita capital inputs, 
and the real interest rate in the monetary union, respectively, and r  is a constant. By equation 
(9), 
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in the monetary union. By equations (31), (32), and (33),  
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if sustainable heterogeneity is kept. 
 
3.2.2  The law of motion for inflation 
Each member government maximizes its expected utility subject to constraints. However, unlike 
the single-country model, the constraint is not limited to equation (3). The real current account 
balance (ηρ,t) within the monetary union in each member state must be stable at steady state; 
thus,  
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  limlim                             (35) 
 
because the economy of the monetary union otherwise eventually collapses. As will be 
discussed in Section 4.2.4, current account balances depend on inflation differentials; thereby, 
 23
ηρ,t is a function of π1,t,π2,t,  …, πN,t and thus a function of θG,1,t,θG,2,t,  …, θG,N,t and θP, such 
that   
 
  PN,tG,tG,tGi,t ,...,,hη  ,,2,1, ,  
 
where πρ,t is the rate of inflation in member state ρ. Each member government therefore 
maximizes its expected utility subject to not only equation (3) but also equation (35). 
 By equations (18), (32) and (34), the law of motion for inflation is  
 
   ρ,t
t
t
s
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Therefore, if 
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
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                       (36) 
 
for any ρ, inflation does not accelerate in the monetary union (i.e., 0tπ ). Because 
  011 










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P
αN
q
q
θαvNμ
ωα
, equation (36) indicates that, unlike the exogenous growth model 
shown in Section 2 in which inflation does not accelerate if pG θθ  , inflation does not 
accelerate in the framework of endogenous growth if pG θθ  . 
 However, an additional element in the behavior of government should also be 
considered in the framework of endogenous growth. Unlike the exogenous growth model, the 
economy grows at a constant rate in the endogenous growth model. As yt increases, xt and gt will 
not remain at the same level as before because, as the economy grows, the capability of the 
government to collect and spend money also increases. Conversely, as the economy grows, the 
utility obtained by spending a unit of gt and disutility generated by imposing a unit of xt 
decrease. Considering this scale effect, the utility function of government is replaced with 
 
  ρ,tρ,tρ,tG, ρ ,yx,gu  . 
 
Notice that yρ,t is exogenous for the government, although it is endogenous for households. The 
constant endogenous growth of yρ,t is perceived by the government as successive exogenous 
shocks on yρ,t in  ρ,tρ,tρ,tG,ρ ,yx,gu . When an exogenous upward shock of yρ,t occurs, larger gρ,t 
and xρ,t are optimal for the government because of the scale effect; thus, gρ,t and xρ,t begin to 
increase on the transition path to the new steady state. The government perceives that 
exogenous shocks on yρ,t continuously occur because of the constant endogenous growth of yρ,t; 
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thereby, gρ,t and xρ,t continuously move to new transition paths. Because  G,ρ
ρ,t
ρ,t
g,ρ θg
gε   
ρ,t
t
t
s
s ρ,υt πdsdυπr    1 1 , ρ,ttt ss ρ,υtG,ρρ,tρ,tx,ρ πdsdυπrθx
xε    1 1 , 0ρ,tρ,tg
g , and 0
ρ,t
ρ,t
x
x  
on transition paths, and because 0g,ρε  and 0x,ρε , then by equations (32) and (34), if 
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is always satisfied for any ρ, inflation does not accelerate where Ω is a positive variable. Hence, 
if   P
αN
q
q
θαvNμ
ωα
Ω 








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

1
1

, then when the central bank of the monetary union keeps 
pG θθ  , inflation does not accelerate even in the framework of endogenous growth.  
 
4  THE EURO’S FLAW  
 
4.1  The basic structure 
The euro is examined in this section using the model of monetary union constructed in Section 3. 
For simplicity, the degree of relative risk aversion of the representative household is assumed to 
be identical in all euro member states. Productivity and the time preference rate of the 
representative household, however, are assumed to be heterogeneous across member states. The 
productivity differential parameter in member state ρ (ωρ) is given exogenously and is constant 
for any ρ. The time preference rate of the representative household in member state ρ is θP,ρ and 
is inversely correlated to the productivity differential parameter ωρ (see, e.g., Lawrance, 1991; 
Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003). The integrated time preference rate of the representative 
household of all member states is P
N
q
qP,q
N
q
q θωθω 


 


 1
1
1
. The intrinsic time preference 
rate of the government of member state ρ is G,ρθ  and G,ρθ > θP,ρ. The actual time preference 
rate of the government of member state ρ in period t is θG,ρ,t, and it is time variable because of 
control by the ECB. The integrated actual time preference rate of all member governments in 
period t is G,t
N
q
qtG,ρ,
N
q
q θωθω 


 


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1
1
. For simplicity, suppose that, because of the scale 
effect shown in Section 3.2.2,   P
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q
q
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Ω 

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
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
 is always satisfied. Hence, the ECB 
needs to set θG,t equal to θP not to accelerate the overall rate of inflation in the euro area. 
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Because θG,t = θP is kept by the ECB, each government is expected to adjust its time preference 
rate θG,ρ,t equal to θP. If a government does not sufficiently adjust its θG,ρ,t and sets θG,ρ,t > θP, it 
deviates from the expected behavior; such behavior is called a “deviation” hereafter.  
 
4.2  Factors that generate the flaw 
4.2.1  Adhering to own preferences 
The law of motion for inflation shown in equation (20) indicates that inflation does not 
accelerate because a government acts in a stupid, foolish, or irrational manner, but rather 
because it behaves quite normally—it adheres to its intrinsic time preference unless an 
independent neutral institution (i.e., a central bank) forces it to stop doing so. However, a 
fundamental question arises. Even if the government is acting quite normally, is this behavior 
rational? In economics, rationality usually means that, given the available information, optimal 
decisions to achieve an objective are taken and rational behavior is generally assumed. However, 
can rational behavior still prevail when a government cannot optimize its behavior to achieve its 
objective? This special situation emerges if the central bank is perfectly independent and is 
firmly determined to stabilize inflation and if, at the same time, the intrinsic time preference rate 
of government is unchangeable. In this situation, the economy will destabilize and eventually 
collapse as shown in Section 2. Therefore, the government cannot achieve its objective (i.e., 
cannot maximize its expected utility) and can only behave irrationally in this case. Conversely, 
if the government wants to optimize its objective and behave rationally, it must change its time 
preference. Clearly, trade-offs between rationality and time preference exist in some situations, 
and either rationality or time preference must be endogenized.  
 Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that people will not optimize their behavior to meet 
their objectives (i.e., maximize utility) if they have complete knowledge of the optimal path. 
Hence, rationality should prevail over preferences, and time preference will be endogenized 
when a clash between rationality and time preference occurs. If time preference is endogenized, 
rational decisions become possible.  
 Even though rationality should eventually prevail over preferences, governments will 
not easily change their own preferences. They will resist endogenizing them and search for 
options to escape from doing so—it is this stubborn nature that drives governments to deviate 
from the path specified by the ECB. Section 2 indicated that the inflation problem is equivalent 
to the deviation problem. The mechanism of inflation differentials in the euro area, therefore, 
must be fully examined considering this driving force of deviation.   
 Even though unfavorable consequences are expected if no change is made, it can be 
very difficult to change one’s own preferences alone. Controlling preferences therefore usually 
requires the help of other people or institutions, which is one of the reasons why independent 
central banks were established to stabilize inflation. Nevertheless, as will be examined in the 
following sections, the question arises whether the ECB can fully control each member 
government’s desire to adhere to its own time preference rate.  
 
4.2.2  The limited capability of the ECB 
The ECB faces a problem that most other central banks do not face. There are an infinite 
number of combinations of θG,ρ,t that satisfy P
N
q
qtG, ρ,
N
q
qG,t θωθωθ 


 


 1
1
1
, but the ECB 
cannot force its member governments to select the combination that it wants them to select. That 
is, the ECB cannot separately control θG,ρ,t, only θG,t collectively.  
 As shown in Section 2.2, the central bank in the single-country model punishes the 
government’s deviation by raising the nominal interest rate such that ψπθi tG,tt  . Equation 
ttG,t πiθ   (equation [22]) is not satisfied until the government obeys the central bank and 
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lowers θG,t. However, the ECB cannot effectively impose ψ separately on each member state; 
thereby, equation ρ,tρ,ttG,ρ, πiθ   can be satisfied in a member state even though tG,ρ,θ  
PG,t θθ  . Even if a government behaves based on its own G,ρθ  that is different from θP, the 
ECB can neither punish nor force the government to transition to PG,ttG,ρ, θθθ  . As a result, 
the combination of θG,ρ,t is not selected only by the ECB but rather through conflict, negotiation, 
and cooperation among the member governments. Thereby, the possibility exists that, at the 
same time, Pρ,tG, θθ   for some member states and Pρ,tG, θ  for others and PG,t θθ   is kept. 
Unlike most other central banks, independence is not sufficient for the ECB to fully stabilize 
inflation. 
 
4.2.3  Diverse inflation rates owing to non-tradability 
Because all member states use the same currency, the price level would be identical across the 
euro area by arbitrage if all goods and services were traded freely inside the euro area. However, 
not all goods and services are tradable. If anything, the share of non-tradable goods and services 
in the euro area is large (e.g., Altissimo et al., 2005). Unlike tradable goods and services, the 
prices of non-tradable goods and services are not equalized by arbitrage. This price 
heterogeneity indicates that the rate of inflation in each member state can also be heterogeneous, 
and heterogeneous inflation indicates that governments may deviate from the path the ECB sets, 
at least temporarily. Member governments may enjoy periods when they behave based on their 
own intrinsic G,ρθ that is higher than PG,t θθ  .  
 Note that even though inflation is heterogeneous, the marginal product of capital in 
every industry in every member state is kept identical by arbitrage; that is, P
ρ,t
ρ,t θ
k
y 
 , because 
capital flows freely within the euro area.  
 
4.2.4  Current account imbalances owing to inflation differentials 
Inflation differentials will lead to current account imbalances (e.g., Blanchard, 2007; Arghyrou 
and Chortareas, 2008; EC, 2009). Although inflation rates diverge among the member states, the 
prices of tradable goods and services are still generally equalized across the euro area by 
arbitrage. The equalization is realized by outflows of cheaper tradable goods and services from 
member states with lower inflation member states to the states with higher inflation. The 
inflowing goods and services eventually will need to be purchased with money from the 
exporting member states (lower inflation states) because the importing states (higher inflation 
states) are not obtaining money by exporting either their higher priced tradable goods or their 
non-tradable goods and services. A large part of borrowed money, therefore, is used not for 
investment but for consumption in the higher inflation member states. As a result, the trade and 
current account balances in member states with higher inflation will show continuous deficits.  
 
4.3  The mechanism of the flaw 
4.3.1  The utility functional 
Considering the conflict between rationality and preference, the government’s utility function  ρ,tρ,tG,ρ x,gu  is extended to the functional consisting of the utility function  ρ,tρ,tG,ρ x,gu  and 
a variable tG,ρ,θ~  such that  
 
   tG,ρ,ρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ θ,x,guu ~~  , 
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where tG,ρ,G,ρtG,ρ, θθθ ~ .9 The government has a strong desire to behave based on its intrinsic 
time preference rate but it has to change its rate for it to behave rationally under the control of 
the ECB. tG,ρ,θ~  represents the gap between the reality (θG,ρ,t) and the desire ( G,ρθ ). For 
simplicity, only the case 0~ tG,ρ,θ  is examined. The functional has the following properties: 
 
    0~ ~~  tG,ρ, tG,ρ,ρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ θ
θ,x,guu  and    0~ ~~ 22  tG,ρ, tG,ρ,ρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ θ
θ,x,guu  . 
The more θG,ρ,t is forced to decrease, the more utility decreases, but the magnitude of the 
decrease diminishes as the scale of the forced decrease increases. As a whole, each member 
government maximizes its expected utility 
 
      dtdsθθ,x,guuE t sG, ρ,tG, ρ,ρ,tρ,tG, ρG, ρ   00 exp~~   
 
subject to equations (3) and (35). In addition, the ECB always keeps PG,t θθ   for any t, by 
which θG,ρ,t is endogenized.  
  If there is an inflation differential, equation (35) cannot be satisfied. Hence, a 
necessary condition for satisfying equation (35) is PG,ttρ,G, θθθ   for any ρ, and an indefinite 
deviation is therefore impossible. Although an indefinite deviation is impossible, temporary and 
intermittent deviations may be possible. However, because of equation (35) and PG,t θθ  , 
deviations necessitate future corrections. Because deviations increase current account deficits 
and, consequently, external debt burdens (see Section 4.2.4), θG,ρ,t must be made temporarily 
lower than θP in some future periods to decrease πρ,t and external debt burdens before current 
account imbalances can stabilize (i.e., before PG,tG,ρ,ρ θθθ   for any ρ is achieved). If the 
utility gains resulting from a temporary deviation exceed the discounted sum of disutility caused 
by the future correction of the deviation, the deviation will be selected as a rational choice.  
 Note that if a member government temporarily behaves based on a θG,ρ,t that is higher 
than PtG, θθ  , then at least one of the other member states has to set its θG,ρ below θG,t during 
the deviating period because the ECB keeps PtG, θθ  . 
 
4.3.2  Rational deviations 
 Suppose that a member government deviates by discontinuously increasing (hereafter 
“jumping”) its θG,ρ,t from the ECB’s target rate ( PtG, θθ  ) to  PG,ρ θθ   and keeping it until  
1tt  . The government corrects the deviation after t1 by jumping θG,ρ,t downwards to  PG,ρ θθ ˆ  
and keeping it there during 21 ttt  . After t2, the government keeps PtG,tG,ρ, θθθ  . Hence, 
the government’s expected utility when it deviates and later corrects the deviation is 
 
        dttθ,x,guuEΛ G,ρt ρ,tρtG,ρG,ρD   exp0~10  
               dttθθθ,x,guudttθE G,ρtt G,ρG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρt G,ρ ˆexpˆ~exp 2110    
                                                          
9 The utility function of government is  ρ,tρ,tρ,tG,ρ ,yx,gu  if the scale effect shown in Section 3.2.2 is explicitly 
considered. However, for simplicity, the scale effect is made implicit and  ρ,tρ,tG,ρ x,gu  is used. 
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                 dttθθθ,x,guudttθdttθE G,tt G,tG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρtt G,ρt G,ρ    exp~ˆexpexp 22110  . 
 
Here, if the government does not deviate, its expected utility is  
 
       dttθθθ,x,guuEΛ G,tG,tG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρN   exp~0  . 
 
Hence, 
 
        dttθ,x,guuEΛΛ t G,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρND   10 exp0~  
                 dttθθθ,x,guuE t G,tG,tG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ  10 exp~  
                   dttθθθ,x,guudttθE G,ρtt G,ρG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρt G,ρ ˆexpˆ~exp 2110    
                   dtθθθ,x,guudtθE G,ttt G,tG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρt G,t   exp~exp 2110  
                     dtθθθ,x,guudttθdttθE G,tt G,tG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρtt G,ρt G,ρ    exp~ˆexpexp 22110   
                   dtθθθ,x,guudtθE G,tt G,tG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρt G,t    exp~exp 220 .           (38) 
 
Let Λ1, Λ2, …, Λ6 be the first, second, …, sixth terms of the right side of equation (38), 
respectively. 21 ΛΛ   indicates the utility gain owing to the deviation, and 43 ΛΛ   indicates 
the utility loss owing to the future correction. 065  ΛΛ  and 4321 ΛΛΛΛΛΛ ND   
because       0expˆexpexp 22
1
1
00
  dtθdttθdttθ t G,ttt G,ρt G,ρ . 
 If the correction is implemented in a far shorter period than the deviating period and 
thus the scale of correction in each period is far larger than the scale of deviation in each period, 
then  4321 ΛΛΛΛ   because    0~ ~~ 22  tG,ρ, tG,ρ,ρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ θ
θ,x,guu  and of the effect of the 
discount factor. Hence, if   
2
2
~
~~
tG,ρ,
tG,ρ,ρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ
θ
θ,x,guu

  is sufficiently large, 0 ND ΛΛ ; that is, 
the expected utility gains owing to the early deviation will exceed the discounted sum of the 
expected utility losses resulting from the future correction. This means that a government will 
rationally choose to deviate. Therefore, in a euro-type monetary union in which the central bank 
has only limited enforcement power, substantial deviations of member governments will happen 
and be left unchecked for a relatively long period. 
 Notice that deviation paths are not limited to the type shown above. It was assumed in 
the above examination that the correction is taken just after the deviation ends. However, it is 
possible to postpone the correction to the far future. During the period between the deviation 
and the postponed corrections, PtG,tG,ρ, θθθ   is kept. 
 
4.3.3  Inflation differentials  
By the law of motion for inflation, inflation will temporarily accelerate in the deviating member 
state even though overall inflation in the euro area does not accelerate because of ECB control. 
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Because the deviations should be temporary, inflation acceleration will be small scale, but 
non-negligible inflation differentials will be observed. If the correction is postponed to far future 
periods after the deviation ends, PtG,tG,ρ, θθθ   is kept and inflation does not accelerate 
during the interim period. However, because the deviation is left uncorrected, the relatively high 
rate of inflation continues in the deviating member state by the law of motion for inflation, and 
the inflation differentials thereby continue during this period. In addition, because the scale of 
deviation increases as the government’s intrinsic time preference rate ( G,ρθ ) increases and the 
rate of time preference is empirically inversely correlated to productivity (see, e.g., Lawrance, 
1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003), relatively less productive member states (that have a 
relatively higher intrinsic time preference rate) will experience larger scale deviations and 
consequently higher inflation than relatively more productive member states. These features of 
inflation differentials predicted by the model are basically consistent with the observed 
persistent inflation differentials in the euro area. 
 
4.3.4  Fiscal deficits 
When θG,ρ,t jumps upwards, the government’s fiscal balance and debts are governed by non-liner 
complex processes. For simplicity, these processes are examined here based on the exogenous 
growth model used in Section 2. The thick solid line in Figure 1 indicates the steady state values 
of 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
b
gx   corresponding to those of ρ,tρ,t πi  . Suppose that the economy is first at 
steady state (point E in Figure 1). Then, by the upwards jump of θG,ρ,t, the steady state moves 
from E to E~ . Because of the steady state shift, 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
b
gx   jumps downwards from E to 
J and then moves upwards on the transition path to E~  (along the thick dotted line in Figure 1). 
Accordingly, gρ,t and xρ,t jump to their transition paths and proceed on them to the new steady 
state. Note that, because seigniorage (φρ,t) plays a limited role in modern economies, it is 
assumed here for simplicity that 0
ρ,t
ρ,t

  even after the jump.  
 By equations (14), (16) and (17),  
 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
tG,ρ, b
gxθ                            (39) 
 
at any steady state (see Harashima, 2006, 2008). Hence, the upwards jump of θG,ρ,t requires a 
decrease of steady state bρ,t and/or an increase of steady state ρ,tρ,t gx   to satisfy equation 
(39). Because both an increase of steady state xρ,t and a decrease of steady state gρ,t reduce the 
utility at steady state, the steady state bρ,t is expected to decrease to satisfy equation (39). Hence, 
the government’s real debts bρ,t are smaller at the new steady state E
~  than at the previous 
steady state E. Note that the level of bρ,t is not determined only by equation (39) but also by the 
initial level of bρ,t and exogenous shocks on bρ,t (e.g., discretionary fiscal policies in case of a 
recession).  
 Because bρ,t is a stock variable and cannot move drastically and discontinuously, 
ρ,tρ,t gx   (not bρ,t) jumps downward substantially as 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
b
gx   jumps downward to J. 
Here, 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
ρ,tρ,t
ρ,t
ρ,t
b
gxπi
b
b   by equation (1). In addition, πρ,t and iρ,t cannot jump and 
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remain at almost the same values just after the jump by the law of motion for inflation. 
Therefore, if the downward jump of ρ,tρ,t gx   is sufficiently large, 0
ρ,t
ρ,t
b
b  and the fiscal 
balance ( ρ,tb ) shows deficits initially after the jump. However, as bρ,t gradually increases 
because of the fiscal deficits, ρ,tρ,t gx   also gradually increases but more rapidly than bρ,t to 
satisfy equation (39) (i.e., 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
b
gx   gradually increases on the transition path from J to 
E~  in Figure 1), and after a certain period, fiscal deficits turn to surpluses. The government’s 
real debts bρ,t that initially increased after the jump eventually then start to decrease and move to 
a lower level than the previous steady state bρ,t at E (Figure 2). The fiscal balance and 
government debt after the jump therefore are governed by non-linear complex processes. If the 
deviation is not a single jump but intermittently repeated, the process of fiscal balance will 
become substantially more complex. 
 The amount by which fiscal deficits initially increase depends on the values of εg,ρ and 
εx,ρ and other conditions, including the scale of deviation. The values of εg,ρ and εx,ρ will be 
heterogeneous among the member states, similar to θG,ρ,t, and the scale of deviation will be also 
heterogeneous. Therefore, fiscal balances after deviations will be governed by different 
processes across the member states. The features of non-linearity, complexity, and heterogeneity 
indicate that the SGP requirement that budget deficits of less than 3% of GDP are allowable 
whereas those over 3% must be punished in any period for any member state may not be 
reasonable. These features suggest that focusing only on fiscal deficits and setting an inflexible 
and non-country-specific ceiling on fiscal deficits and debts are not necessarily an appropriate 
way to prevent deviations. 
 
4.3.5  Current account deficits  
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, although inflation diverges among the member states owing to 
deviations, the prices of tradable goods and services are still equalized generally across the euro 
area by arbitrage. As a result, the trade and current account balances in the deviating member 
state will show continuous deficits. Accordingly, relatively less competitive firms producing 
tradable goods or services in deviating member states will disappear more rapidly because of the 
price differentials and the inflows of foreign goods and services. Industries of tradable goods 
and services will decline and the share of non-tradable goods and services industries will 
increase in deviating member states. The features of current account imbalances predicted by 
the model are basically consistent with the observed current account imbalances in the euro 
area.  
 If floating exchange rates were working, current account imbalances would be 
adjusted substantially through currency depreciation in deviating member states, but there is no 
such mechanism within the euro area. As a result, external debts of the deviating member states 
will accumulate continuously until the distortion caused by the deviation is corrected. The 
accumulation of external debts may not immediately threaten the euro. However, as more 
external debts accumulate, the economies of the deviating member states will become more 
vulnerable to various shocks, and because the member states’ economies are closely linked, the 
entire economy of the euro area also becomes more vulnerable to various shocks.  
 
4.4  Comparison with a currency peg 
A foreign currency peg is similar to the situation with the euro because, in essence, more than 
one state uses the same currency. However, there is a fundamental difference between these 
situations. In the case of a currency peg, there are not only multiple governments but also 
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multiple central banks. Hence, the central bank can directly control its government’s behavior in 
each country. Nevertheless, the fixed exchange ratio can only be maintained if inflation is 
stabilized in the pegging and pegged countries. The fixed exchange rate is not automatically 
kept—it is the result of work to stabilize inflation in both countries. The exchange rate will soon 
destabilize if the efforts to stabilize inflation are relaxed. Central banks in countries adopting a 
currency peg need to be sufficiently independent or the peg cannot be maintained. This is one 
reason why a currency peg is usually introduced as a tool to stabilize ongoing high inflation in 
pegging countries.  
 On the other hand, the euro unconditionally guarantees the same value across member 
states regardless of efforts to stabilize inflation in each state. Combining central banks deprives 
the incentive to and removes the tool to locally stabilize inflation. It may have been presumed 
that, if the overall inflation in the euro area is stabilized, local inflation will also naturally 
stabilize even though member governments are heterogeneous and independent. However, as 
shown in the previous sections, local inflation can be differentiated if governments are 
heterogeneous and independent. 
 
4.5  Solution? 
4.5.1  The ECB and the SGP 
Because the ECB cannot control θG,ρ,t separately but only θG,t collectively, the only way for the 
ECB to punish deviating governments is to raise the interest rate with the hope of targeting the 
deviating governments. However, the higher interest rate will hurt not only the deviating 
member states but also non-deviating member states. Hence, this method is not practical. 
Alternatively, therefore, the SGP was created to control the behavior of each member 
government. The SGP was regarded as a substitute for the functions of a federal government. If 
the SGP functioned well, each θG,ρ,t could be controlled separately and sufficiently. However, 
the current financial crisis indicates that the rules stipulated in the SGP are ineffective and 
insufficient as a substitute. Moreover, even before the financial crisis, the SGP was criticized for 
not functioning well.  
 Two deficiencies of the SGP have often been mentioned. First, the SGP has been 
accused of lacking flexibility (e.g., de Grauwe, 2005). Namely, even in a severe recession, large 
discretionary fiscal policies are not allowed because fiscal deficits of more than 3% of GDP are 
prohibited. This prohibition is not necessarily groundless because it is difficult to distinguish 
discretionary fiscal policies from deviations, and if this restriction were relaxed, deviations 
would no doubt prevail. However, fiscal deficits of more than 3% of GDP have not been 
historically rare. In fact, actual violations of the rule have been relatively common on the pretext 
of discretionary fiscal policies. The SGP reform in 2005 added some flexibility to this rule, but 
its fundamental property was not changed. 
 The SGP has also been criticized for possessing weak enforcement powers (e.g., 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998; Buti et al., 2003). Even if a government violates a rule, the 
other governments cannot immediately and sufficiently punish the violating government. 
Furthermore, the weak enforcement power generates an unfavorable byproduct, that is, a high 
probability of cheating by member governments. A cheating government may expect support 
from other governments because the non-cheating governments want to prevent the euro area 
from breaking up. A government may also expect, perhaps wishfully, that relatively stronger 
economies in the euro area have a responsibility to stabilize the euro in any case, thereby 
generating moral hazard.  
 In addition to the abovementioned deficiencies, Section 4.3.4 shows another problem 
of the SGP—fiscal deficits are not necessarily an appropriate indicator of government’s 
deviating behavior. It is well known that the relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation is 
empirically ambiguous (Karras, 1994; Darrat, 2000; Fischer et al., 2002). Section 4.3.4 shows 
that this ambiguity is attributed to the non-linear complex relationship between fiscal deficits 
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and θG,ρ,t (Figures 1 and 2). The movement of fiscal deficits caused by a shift of θG,ρ,t is 
determined by the functional form of  ρ,tρ,tρ,tG,ρ ,yx,gu  and the values of εg,ρ, εx,ρ, and other 
parameters. The magnitude of allowable fiscal deficits will vary according to complex 
interactions among all of these variables. Therefore, controlling fiscal deficits is not necessarily 
equivalent to controlling θG,ρ,t. The 3% ceiling may restrain deviations to some extent, but a 
significant deviation may not generate a fiscal deficit of more than 3% of GDP. As a whole, 
relying only on a rule that sets an inflexible ceiling on fiscal deficits and debts to prevent 
deviations in the behavior of governments does not appear to address real-world needs.  
 
4.5.2  Greater political unification  
Although the euro may be regarded by and large as a success because it can prevent indefinite 
deviations of government, this paper has pointed out an important flaw that exacerbates 
imbalances and instability. To fix the flaw, innovative tools must be used that separately control 
θG,ρ,t. However, doing so is an extremely difficult task, and an alternative approach may be 
necessary. Consideration should be given to unifying θG,ρ,t so it would no longer have to be 
controlled in each country separately. A unified θG,ρ,t would mean that a federal euro area 
government is created, but that will be politically very difficult and unrealistic under current 
political conditions. A more realistic alternative is to create an institution that is not as rigid as a 
federal government but that can more effectively monitor and supervise member governments 
and more forcibly bind their activities. This supranational institution should possess similar 
enforcement power of a federal government in some policy fields, particularly in allocating 
budgets.  
 The creation of such a supranational institution poses fundamental problems, however. 
Governments decide the amount and the allocation of expenditures on defense, social welfare, 
education, and other areas as well as the amount and allocation of taxes imposed to cover these 
expenditures. These decisions are an indispensable source of the power and sovereign authority 
of a government. The people in a member state give the power to allocate budgets to a 
government, but they do not give it unconditionally. People give such power through a political 
process because determinations of government expenditures and taxes are fundamentally 
political issues. Hence, the power of allocating budgets will never be delegated to a politically 
neutral institution. In contrast, monetary policies are usually delegated to politically neutral 
central banks because the central bank is only given the power to control the time preference of 
government, and the power to allocate budgets still remains in the hands of the government (i.e., 
the people). People do not therefore regard the delegation of some authority to a central bank a 
renunciation of their essential sovereignty. It may represent a renunciation of a very small part 
of their sovereignty, but the benefits of the delegation far exceed the costs. On the other hand, 
people will regard that the delegation of the power to allocate budgets to a politically neutral 
institution as a significant renunciation of sovereignty because a politically neutral institution is 
not required to follow people’s political demands. Therefore, the supranational institution 
required to fix the euro’s flaw must be a fundamentally political institution similar to a federal 
government. This nature is important because, for the supranational institution to be sufficiently 
political, the national sovereignty of each member state needs to be substantially renounced and 
transferred to the supranational institution.  
 The flaw in the euro highlights the tension between national sovereignty and stability 
in the euro area economy. The more the member states renounce their national sovereignty, the 
more the euro area economy will stabilize. The current financial crisis indicates that the problem 
caused by this tension is economically important and implies that the balance between national 
sovereignty and economic stability should shift more towards economic stability. The 
magnitude and persistence of inflation differentials in the euro area are much more substantial 
than those among the states in the U.S. (Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2007; Fendel and Frenkel, 
2009). The model in this paper implies that this difference emerges because of the different 
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degrees of political unification between the states in the U.S. and the member states of the euro 
area. A political mechanism that unifies political positions of the member governments on fiscal 
policies in a flexible manner and enforces the unified political decisions is needed to increase 
stability in the euro area. Any such mechanism or organization should not be governed by 
inflexible rules or bureaucrats but by representatives democratically elected from across the 
euro area who would determine overall fiscal policies at any given time.  
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Since its creation, the euro has been criticized for lacking a unified fiscal authority, and the 
recent financial crisis has intensified the anxiety that the euro is seriously flawed. In this paper, 
a model is constructed in which the optimization behaviors of government as well as those of 
households, firms, and the ECB are explicitly and separately incorporated. The model indicates 
that inflation accelerates if the rate of time preference of the government is higher than that of 
the representative household; thus, the government must change its time preference for inflation 
not to accelerate. However, the desire to adhere to own preferences is so strong that 
governments seek to maintain their own time preference rates. Euro area governments can 
temporarily maintain their own intrinsic time preference rates because the ECB cannot 
implement monetary policies aimed separately and specifically at each of the member states. 
The model indicates that deviations in an individual government’s behavior generate inflation 
differentials, current account imbalances, and fiscal deficits. In addition, the examination of the 
inflation differentials in the euro area provides important and clear evidence that inflation 
acceleration is not caused by monetary policies but by government behavior because inflation in 
the member states has diverged even though monetary policies are unified. 
 The SGP does not appear to have been sufficiently effective in preventing government 
deviations. An alternative mechanism that controls each government’s time preference is 
required. Establishing a federal government or some other supranational institution in the euro 
area may help solve the problem, but it will be very difficult and perhaps even unrealistic under 
current political conditions. In any case, any supranational or federal institution created must be 
a political institution that represents the political will of the people.  
 The current financial crisis implies that the flaw of the euro shown in this paper is 
economically important. Furthermore, other types of deviations may be induced because of the 
lack of a federal government. The flaw has made the euro substantially vulnerable to various 
shocks, and therefore the balance between national sovereignty and economic stability should 
be shifted more towards stability through a higher degree of political unification or the 
probability of breakup of the euro area remains relatively high. 
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Figure 1  The transition path after the jump of θG,ρ 
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Figure 2  The government’s real debts after the jump of θG,ρ 
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